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FOREWORD
In this study, Mr. Kashmeri argues his thesis that
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has
evolved from a confident, mission driven Alliance
with a clear objective, to an organization that appears
to be in disarray, still looking for a unifying mission 20
years after its reason for creation—the Soviet Union—
ceased to exist.
Mr. Kashmeri maintains that the action to enforce
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
1073 against Libya is the latest in a series of demonstrations that highlight the disarray of the Alliance.
He states that after weeks of preparation and increasingly optimistic statements about its readiness to
enforce the UNSCR, Britain, France, and the United
States chose to intervene in Libya alone. Mr. Kashmeri
believes that NATO was once again sidelined as it had
been after September 11, 2001 (9/11), when the United
States unilaterally decided to go to war in Afghanistan. He argues that Afghanistan continues to demonstrate that, even in a deployment, NATO is far from a
monolithic, efficient fighting force, since many of the
allies have refused to participate in that war and, even
before the end of the campaign, some are going home.
The primary question that Mr. Kashmeri attempts
to answer is: So, what next for the once fabled alliance? In doing so, Mr. Kashmeri points out that dur
ing NATO’s deterioration the European Union’s (EU)
Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has
deployed 27 successful military/civil missions from
Africa to Asia. These include the EU Naval force off
Somalia—that is twice the size of NATO’s—and the
EU mission to Chad that successfully deployed and
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sustained a mobile fighting force of 3,800 troops
thousands of kilometers from Brussels, Belgium. Mr.
Kashmeri contends that through CSDP, Europeans
are increasingly taking charge of managing their own
foreign and security policy. NATO is no longer the
sole and preeminent Euro-Atlantic security actor.
Mr. Kashmeri asserts that NATO’s survival depends on its willingness to accept its reduced role
and let the EU handle the day-to-day security needs
of Europe and its periphery. NATO’s continued exis
tence, Kashmeri maintains, is in a supporting capacity
to CSDP and in its ability to craft a relationship with
CSDP that will allow North America and Europe to
act militarily together, should that ever become nec
essary. Mr. Kashmeri believes that watching NATO
fade into irrelevance would be a mistake, since it is
a tried and true platform to harness the resources of
North America and Europe.
In conclusion, Mr. Kashmeri suggests that it is time
for NATO 2.0, a new version of NATO that fits the
realities of an ever more integrated Europe in the 21st
century. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to
offer this monograph as a topic of debate concerning
European security and defense issues.
		
		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This report recommends that:
• The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
be bridged to the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).
• The EU assume responsibility for the defense of
Europe.
• NATO and CSDP continue to serve as the platform to enable the United States, Europe, and
Canada to act militarily together in cases where
severity of the issue calls for joint action.
The monograph recommends that these changes in
the structure of Euro-Atlantic defense and security be
initiated forthwith and completed within 3-5 years. It
also contends that if NATO is not bridged to CSDP,
NATO will become less and less relevant for the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and may well fade away
as a military alliance.
The recommendations are based on the author’s
original research and conversations with over 50
military and political leaders, as well as academics
and diplomats from Europe and the United States.
They include General (Ret.) Bantz J. Craddock, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR); Lieutenant General (Ret.) Brent Scowcroft,
former National Security Advisor and CEO of The
Scowcroft Group; Lieutenant General Christopher J.
R. Davis, CMM, CD Canadian Military Representative to NATO; Ersin Onunduran, Professor of International Relations, Ankara University, Turkey; General
Håkan Syrén, Chairman, European Union Military
Committee (Brussels, Belgium); General Karl-Heinz
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Lather, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers in Europe, NATO (Mons, Belgium); and General Stephane Abrial, Supreme Allied Commander for
Transformation, NATO.
The author’s research indicates that, through the
EU’s CSDP, Europeans are now capable of defending
their own territory, except in extraordinary situations
and threats that require a combined response from the
EU, Canada, and the United States. This monograph
concludes that except for these extreme eventualities,
NATO should serve in a supporting role to CSDP. It
states that NATO is increasingly dysfunctional, makes
commitments it cannot keep, and continues to assume
responsibilities that it cannot fulfill, especially given
the diminishing financial resources at its disposal. The
New Strategic Concept (Stratcon) adopted by NATO in
Lisbon, Portugal, at its November 2010 Summit did
not, unhappily, deal with its degenerative symptoms.
Nor did the Stratcon recognize the impact of Europe’s
increasingly integrated foreign and security policy on
NATO’s future.
If CSDP and NATO are not bridged, NATO will
become increasingly irrelevant to Euro-Atlantic security and then likely fade away. That would be a real
tragedy. It is far from certain the Alliance could be recreated again, and NATO’s fade-out would remove an
important political and military link from the transatlantic relationship.
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THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION’S COMMON
SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY:
INTERSECTING TRAJECTORIES
INTRODUCTION
General Brent Scowcroft, dean of the American
foreign policy establishment, has a deceptively simple
test to determine whether the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) is still relevant. His test is in the
form of a question: “What is NATO for?”
It is a question that has bedeviled NATO since
the 1989 demise of the Soviet Union and end of the
Cold War. NATO has been searching for an answer
to General Scowcroft’s question for 2 decades. It has
not yet found one. Set up in 1949 to defend against the
threat of Soviet aggression, NATO today is increasingly dysfunctional, still searching for a new role 2
decades after the end of the Cold War. Cohesion used
to be NATO’s hallmark, but there is little of it left. The
Eastern and Central European members still consider
Russia to be their main threat, while the Western Europeans no longer do. Eastern and Central Europeans
watch warily as Western European NATO members
link their economies and trade with Russia.1 The sale
of an amphibious helicopter-carrying assault ship, the
Mistral, by France to Russia is but one example of this
breakdown in cohesion among the Alliance’s members.
In 2008 Georgia and Russia fought a brief military
engagement that almost led to the demolition of Georgia by Russian armed forces. A central part of Russia’s
battle strategy was to occupy and neutralize Georgia’s
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Black Sea naval base. An armored thrust rolled across
Georgia and secured this objective in 26 hours. Were
the Russia-Georgia conflict to break out again, the
Mistral would let Russia capture Georgia’s Black Sea
naval installations in 45 minutes.2 The Mistral represented the first weapons sale from a NATO country to
Russia, and it is illustrative of the differing strategic
perspectives of NATO’s Western European members
from Central and Eastern Europeans.
During a speaking engagement at an elite U.S.
Army establishment, the author discovered this difference in perspective first hand. During the discussion period, an American participant asked the author
why, if Georgia in 2008 was well on its way to NATO
membership, did the United States not push NATO to
take a more forceful stance against Russia. Before the
author could respond, a German officer attending the
establishment interjected that Germany would never
have been part of such a plan and if the United States
had insisted on involving NATO, America would
have found itself isolated. He pointed out that Germany and Russia have the best of relations and Germany
would not have jeopardized them.
NATO believed it had found its post Cold-War
mission in 1999 by adopting an “out of area” strategy—transforming itself to be a world-cop—but this
dream is dying a slow death in the mountains of Afghanistan, where many of NATO’s European members avoid the main battles, and are packing up to go
home, even as the war continues. NATO finds it difficult to even send noncombatants to the Afghan war
to relieve the stress on American forces that do most
of the fighting. The Alliance has, for instance, been unable to find the resources to supply half the number of
trainers for Afghanistan that it promised 7 years ago,
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even though the need for them is urgent.3 Yet, it now
proposes to set up an integrated ballistic missile defense system to defend Europe against ballistic missile
attack.
NATO’s Declining Trajectory.
The American military has been losing confidence
in NATO’s capabilities for years. When the Alliance
volunteered to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan after
September 11, 2001 (9/11), the United States summarily dismissed its offer and did the job by itself.4 NATO
supposedly runs the Afghan war by being in charge
of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
But no NATO official was present at President Barack
Obama’s side when he swore in the Alliance’s new
Afghan commander, General David Petraeus, after
firing General Stanley McChrystal, the previous commander. Both actions were all-American affairs and
left out NATO’s top echelon—the Secretary General
and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) who, under the NATO chain of command, is
responsible for all the Alliance’s operations. Neither
was the NATO chain of command used to discipline
and relieve General McChrystal of command.
Part of NATO’s downwards trajectory is due to
demographics. The officials that surrounded President Obama at that June swearing-in were of an age
that gives them an instinctive appreciation of NATO’s
value. But what about younger American military officers who are now moving into senior military ranks?
What do they think of NATO?
On a recent visit to a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier, the
author was seated at dinner between two senior naval
officers whose ages differed by around 15 years. He
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asked the older, the carrier’s executive officer, what he
thought about NATO. The answer was an emphatic
endorsement of the Alliance. Later, when the author
asked the same question of the younger commander
of the carrier’s attack squadrons, the answer was very
different. “I remain to be convinced that NATO serves
a useful purpose anymore.”
This confusion is even more pronounced among
Americans outside the military. “You mean NATO
is still around?” a New York investment banker recently asked the author. The Dean of a college in Boston assured him that she was certain NATO was not a
military force any more. “Probably just humanitarian
assistance,” she said. A retired college professor from
Arizona asked if the author was sure NATO troops
really serve in Afghanistan.
Common Security and Defense Policy’s Rising
Trajectory.
Through the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the European Union (EU) has already
deployed 27 missions from Africa to Asia. Most were
small, but, 2 years ago the EU sent a force of 3,700 European troops for a military operation in Chad and
the Central African Republic. Even as the EU was
engaged in Africa, it organized an anti-piracy naval
flotilla that was twice the size of NATO’s to patrol the
Horn of Africa.5 Both of these operations illuminated
the EU’s ability to deploy and sustain military forces
with a high level of interoperability. In the case of its
African deployment, 10,000 soldiers from 26 countries
were mobilized to allow the EU to transport and sustain a highly mobile force of 3,700 for a period of 19
months more than 3,000 miles from Brussels, Belgium.
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The EU gave the operation commander robust rules of
engagement, which he had to use at an early stage of
the campaign. The force was challenged by organized
military units within the first 30 days and fought them
off in a determined show of force.
Three main reasons account for the European
Union’s growing military clout:
1. The EU is a governmental entity, so it can combine civilian, police, legal, and military resources to
tailor holistic missions that are far better suited to winning hearts and minds than NATO, which is a military
organization.
2. For its naval mission, the EU signed a treaty with
Kenya that gives Kenyan authorities the right to prosecute captured pirates. EU legal and process teams
follow up with help to improve the judicial system
with experts and computers.6 EU missions overcome
the objections some countries have to American-led
NATO forces on their territory. In the case of the EU’s
deployment to Chad and the Central African Republic, the local governments had made it clear that a force
comprised of Americans would not be acceptable.7
3. CSDP is European-owned and operated, consisting of Europeans making decisions in their countries’
national interests, which are not always aligned with
America’s.
The Euro-Atlantic Security Space.
It is worth recalling that neither NATO nor the EU
have a standing military force. Both organizations use
soldiers and equipment from their member nations.
The combined EU military assets are listed in Table
1.8 It is worth noting that 10 countries—the United
Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the
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Netherlands, Greece, Poland, Sweden, and Belgium—
all members of both the EU and NATO—account for
roughly 90 percent of EU defense spending.9
1999:
EU15

1999:
EU27

2009:
EU27

change
’99–’09

Total Expenditure (1997/2007)

€156.2 Bn

€162.9 Bn

€209.7 Bn

+ 29%

Expenditure / GDP (1997/2007)

2.1 %

2.1 %

1.7 %

- 19%

Budget / GDP (1998/2008)

1.7 %

1.8 %

1.4 %

- 22%

1,789,868

2,508,908

2,013,990

- 20%

Army

1,125,718

1,516,378

996,234

- 34%

Navy

281,450

327,400

222,313

- 32%

Air Force

381,605

538,925

345,153

- 36%

Conscripts

669,770

1,131,020

212,785

- 81%

10,827

17,814

9,823

- 45%

6,851

10,622

7,951

- 25%

19,751

26,311

22,844

- 13%

5,600

7,453

5,401

- 28%

2,684

3,835

2,410

- 37%

439

612

898

+ 47%

3,515

4,732

3,573

- 24%

Defense Expenditure*

Armed Forces
Total Active Military**

Equipment
Land
Main Battle Tanks
Armored Fighting Vehicles
Armored Personnel Carriers
Aviation
Fixed Wing Aircraft
Fighter Jets
Transport (incl. tankers)
Helicopters

1,000

1,312

826

- 37%

Combat Support

969

1,305

849

- 35%

Utility (incl. transport)

445

584

1,076

+ 84%

6

6

7

+ 17%

Attack

Naval
Aircraft Carriers

Table 1. ESDP Military Capabilities 1999–2009.
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1999:
EU15

1999:
EU27

2009:
EU27

change
’99–’09

29

31

26

- 16%

Frigates

145

155

108

- 30%

Patrol and Coastal

314

521

811

+ 56%

Mine Warfare

208

296

243

- 18%

Amphibious

267

274

494

+ 80%

Destroyers

The estimates are taken from The Military Balance 1999–2000
and The Military Balance 2009, both published by the International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The 1999–2000 edition uses
figures from November 1998, including for defense budgets—the
exception is defense expenditure estimates that date from 1997.
The 2009 edition uses figures from 2008, except for defense expenditure figures, which date from 2007.
* To calculate defense expenditure in euros, the 1997 total
defense expenditure figures were calculated using the European
Central Bank (ECB) fixed rates to the euro in 1999 where possible,
or the earliest available annual average exchange rate provided
by the ECB. For 2007 figures, where necessary, the ECB annual
average exchange rates of the national currency to the euro were
used.
** This figure also includes military police and paramilitary
forces such as Gendarmerie and Carabinieri, as well as army, navy
and air force estimates.
The editors wish to thank Charlotte Blommestijn for her research assistance in compiling this table.
Source: Daniel Keohane and Charlotte Blommestijn, “Strength
in numbers? Comparing EU military capabilities in 2009 with
1999,” Policy Brief 05, Paris, France: European Union Institute for
Security Studies, December 2009, available from www.iss.europa.
eu/uploads/media/PolicyBrief-05.pdf.

Table 1. ESDP Military Capabilities 1999–2009.
(cont.)
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Both organizations have military staffs, committees, and headquarters that are located within a few
miles of each other, but cannot officially collaborate
because of interminable political issues between Cyprus and Turkey. This political issue is explained further in the Conclusions section.
This expensive duplication is largely paid for by
European taxpayers since 26 out of 28 NATO members are European states (the NATO/EU overlap is
shown in Table 2). In today’s dire economic climate,
when Europeans are slashing their defense budgets,
it is hard to believe that these inefficiencies can long
continue.
Country

European Union

NATO

Belgium

x

x

Bulgaria

x

x

Czech Republic

x

x

Denmark

x

x

Estonia

x

x

France

x

x

Germany

x

x

Greece

x

x

Hungary

x

x

Italy

x

x

Latvia

x

x

Lithuania

x

x

Luxembourg

x

x

Netherlands

x

x

Poland

x

x

Portugal

x

x

Table 2. Membership Overlap between the EU and
NATO.
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Country

European Union

NATO

Romania

x

x

Slovakia

x

x

Slovenia

x

x

Spain

x

x

United Kingdom

x

x

Albania

x

Canada

x

Croatia

x

Iceland

x

Norway

x

Turkey

x

United States

x

Austria

x

Cyprus

x

Finland

x

Ireland

x

Malta

x

Sweden

x

Note: NATO (28 members) and the EU (27 members) have 21
members in common.

Table 2. Membership Overlap between the EU and
NATO. (cont.)
As the United States, its largest member and lynchpin, tires of the unending internal feuds between NATO’s European members and the EU and, responding
to the new geopolitical reality, increasingly shifts its
focus to Asia, NATO risks becoming even more irrelevant to the security needs of the Euro-Atlantic area.10
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NATO’s New Strategic Concept Sidesteps Reality.
Unfortunately, the Group of Experts set up by
NATO’s Secretary General to advise him on NATO’s
New Strategic Concept (Stratcon) and the Stratcon itself chose to overlook both NATO’s dysfunction and
CSDP’s strengths. Instead of a dramatic course correction in NATO’s future mission statement to reconcile
NATO and CSDP, the Stratcon chose to sidestep reality with statements such as:
NATO enters the second decade of the 21st century
as an essential source of stability in an uncertain and
unpredictable world. Looking ahead, the Alliance has
ample grounds for confidence. NATO’s role in maintaining the unity, security and freedom of the Euro-Atlantic region is ongoing. Its status as the globe’s most
successful political-military alliance is unchallenged.11

It is this kind of sentimental thinking and the inability to face reality that has brought NATO to its
present state.
After consulting with over 50 military and government leaders from the United States and Europe, this
report recommends that NATO be bridged to CSDP
and that Europeans take primary responsibility for
their defense. NATO will get a new lease on life, and
a bridged military alliance will at least ensure that
the transatlantic allies remain connected for the times
when Europe, the United States, and Canada wish
to act together. It would be a pity to let NATO fade
away, because we may then have to re-invent it someday and that will not be easy.
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Structure of Report.
Regretfully, CSDP is a relatively unknown entity
not only in American military, but also civilian, circles.
A large part of the reason for this is lack of coverage in
the mainstream media. But another part of the reason
is an ongoing erroneous depiction of Europeans as
loath to engage in military solutions after the success
of setting up the European Union through painstaking
negotiations.12
To correct the CSDP information deficit, the next
two sections of this monograph cover CSDP. The next
section provides a CSDP timeline and seeks to answer
the question: where did CSDP come from? The following section provides a description of three CSDP missions. These deployments were selected to illuminate
the EU’s holistic approach to security and to show the
difference between CSDP’s capabilities and those of
NATO. Finally, the last section outlines policy options
to bridge CSDP and NATO and sets forth recommendations for U.S. military and civilian policymakers.
THE EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE
POLICY, 1999-2011
Background.
The origins of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)13 lie in the process that was used
to transform Europe after World War II from a collection of independent European states into today’s political-economic bloc called the European Union (EU).
The EU developed through a series of treaties that
represent binding commitments by European states to
give up national sovereignty over specific functions,
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such as atomic energy, and coal and steel production,
and to make these functions the responsibility of a
supra-national governmental organization, the EU. It
dates its founding to the Treaty of Rome, signed in
1957. The important Treaty of Maastricht, signed in
1993, coined the phrase “European Union” and defined the so-called “three pillars” on which the EU is
based.14 The first pillar consolidated the communities
and set up the groundwork for the euro; the second
pillar established the EU’s Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP), which makes it possible for the
European Union to take coordinated “European” action in foreign and security affairs; and the third pillar
dealt with justice and home affairs policy.
CSDP is the operational part of CSFP. Though codified in EU law under the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht,
CSDP remained unused for a number of years. The
trigger for activating CSDP was the Balkan conflicts
(Bosnia, 1992-95, and Kosovo, 1999) of the 1990s. Even
though these violent events took place in Europe’s
backyard, the Europeans found they were incapable
of responding to them without the U.S. military and
NATO. Specifically, The EU states discovered that
there was no security mechanism within the EU besides NATO that European countries could use to
forge political consensus among themselves for military action. There were no European facilities to plan,
organize, and manage crisis management missions
besides NATO. The result of this deficit meant the EU
could not respond to an even purely European crisis
without getting NATO and the United States involved.
This was a wakeup call for the EU states.
Nothing could really take the place of NATO as
long as Europe was minutes away from nuclear incineration by the Soviet Union. However, the end of the
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Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991
removed this threat. The realization that years after
the Cold War ended and a half century after the end of
World War II, there was still no European institution
that could undertake these campaigns in Europe’s own
backyard was a frustrating and sobering reminder to
the Europeans that they needed to put their security
house in order.15
Britain and France change the EU’s Security
Equation.
Britain and France decided to change Europe’s
security deficit. At a meeting in Saint Malo, France,
in December 1998, the two countries proposed aggressive steps to fire up the EU’s dormant CSFP. This
landmark agreement and call to action was labeled the
St. Malo Declaration.16
In the Declaration, the two powers declared that “. . .
The European Union needs to be in a position to play
its full role on the international stage. . . . To this end,
the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means
to decide when to use them and a readiness to do so,
in order to respond to international crises.”17
In a great leap forward, the two nations envisioned
military actions in which NATO and the U.S. military
might not be involved and in such instances they said
that “. . . the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources
of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic
planning, without unnecessary duplication. . . ” The
joint declaration goes on to say that “. . . Europe needs
strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to
the new risks, and which are supported by a strong
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and competitive European defense industry and technology. . .”18
The Saint-Malo declaration was then enshrined
in 1999 as the European Security and Defense policy
(ESDP), which encompassed both a specific policy and
a set of dedicated institutions that the EU could use to
plan, approve, and execute joint “crisis-management”
actions.19 (In December 2009, with the Lisbon Treaty,
ESDP formally assumed its original name: Common
Security and Defense Policy, or CSDP. For consistency, the author has used CSDP throughout this monograph.)
CSDP Institutions.
The institutions that the EU set up to execute its
security and military missions are two committees
that are mirror images of their counterparts in NATO:
the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is
the policy making group, and the European Union
Military Committee (EUMC). The PSC is equivalent
to NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the
EUMC to NATO’s Military Committee (MC). It is important to note that the PSC is a body of the Council
of the EU, the highest level EU decisionmaking body
representing the governments of the member states.
The EU also set up its own Military Staff (EUMS),
a Situation Center (SITCEN) to provide intelligence
and monitoring functions, and a Satellite Center (SATCEN) for mapping and positioning support. These institutions were embedded into the EU policymaking
bureaucracy and are located in Brussels.
These CSDP structures also give the EU a firm
foundation to build an even more robust security and
defense structure in the future. The EU description of
these entities follows:20
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The Political and Security Committee (PSC) meets
at the ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for
the Council of the EU. Its main functions are keeping
track of the international situation and helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP), including the ESDP. It prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction.
The European Union Military Committee (EUMC)
is the highest military body set up within the Council.
It is composed of the Chiefs of Defense (CHODS) of
the Member States, who are regularly represented by
their permanent military representatives. The EUMC
provides the PSC with advice and recommendations
on all military matters within the EU. The EUMC is
chaired by a four-star general from one of the EU
states. (Most CHODS are double-hatted with NATO’s
Military Committee.)
The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) is
composed of military and civilian experts seconded
to the Council Secretariat by the Member States. It is
chaired by a lieutenant general seconded from one of
the EU states. The EUMS is the engine of CSDP.
Finally, the EU’s Satellite Center based in Madrid,
Spain, and the Institute for Security Studies based in
Paris, France, were attached to the ESDP machinery to
provide ESDP with mapping and analytical support.21
By 2003, the EU ESDP was operational with a military
staff of around 200, which was still its size in 2010.
To provide a strategic framework for their security
and defense policy, the EU adopted the European Security Strategy in 2003.22
In 2004, the EU’s Defense Agency (EDA) was set
up to support the EU’s member states in their efforts
to improve military capabilities needed for the CSDP.
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It does this by promoting research and development,
armaments, and procurement cooperation and by
working to strengthen the EU defense, technological,
and industrial base.
Recognizing that crisis management operations in
the future would require small, mobile units, in 2007
the EU set a target of organizing nine “battle groups.”
A battle group in EU terminology is a combined arms
grouping of around 1,500 personnel approximately
the size of an infantry battalion or armored regiment.
Specifically, it is the smallest force package capable of
stand-alone operations, including the ability to contribute to an initial entry force.23
The EU’s deployment goals aim for a battle group
to be on the ground within 10 days of a European
Council decision to launch an operation and be sustainable for 30 days initial operations extendable to at
least 120 days. The Battle Group Concept reached full
operational capability in 2007, and two battle groups
have been on continuous readiness since that time.
CSDP has now been in operation for over a decade (1999-2011). During this time, the EU has used
CSDP to deploy 27 military and/or civilian missions,
in some cases to locations thousands of miles from Europe. It is worth noting that with the exception of one
mission, all the deployments were planned and managed without any involvement with NATO’s facilities
or the Alliance’s assets.
Table 3 shows the scope of these deployments as
of May 2009. Note especially the number of deployments that the EU’s institutions are able to manage at
one time.
			

16

Duration in Days
Title Operation Name

Location

Start

Start

Days

End

EUMM (Western Balkans)

EUMM

Jan-03

1826

Jan-08

EUPM BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina)

EUPM BiH

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

Jan-03

2312

May-09

CONCORDIA fYROM (Macedonia)

CONCORDIA fYROM

Macedonia

Apr-03

275

Jan-04

ARTEMIS DRC (Dem. Rep. of
Congo)

ARTEMIS DRC

Dem. Rep.
of Congo

Jun-03

92

Sep-03

EUPOL Proxima fYROM, succ. by
EUPAT fYROM (Macedonia)

EUPOL Proxima fYROM,
succ. By EUPAT fYROM

Macedonia

1-Dec

762

Jan-06

EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia)

EUJUST THEMIS
(Georgia)

Jul-04

396

Aug-05

EUFOR ALTHEA BiH (Bosnia and
Herzegovina)

EUFOR ALTHEA BiH

Dec-04

1612

May-09

EUPOL Kinshasa, succ. by EUPOL
RD CONGO

EUPOL Kinshasa, succ.
by EUPOL RD CONGO

Apr-05

821

Jul-07

EUSEC RD CONGO

EUSEC RD CONGO

Jun-05

1430

May-09

EUJUST LEX (Iraq)

EUJUST LEX (Iraq)

Jul-05

1400

May-09

AMIS EU Supporting Action
(Sudan)

AMIS EU Supporting
Action (Sudan)

Jul-05

914

Jan-08

AMM Aceh (Indonesia)

AMM Aceh

Indonesia

Sep-05

487

Jan-07

EUSR BST (Georgia)

EUSR BST

Georgia

Sep-05

1338

May-09

EUBAM Rafah (Gaza Strip)

EUBAM Rafah

Gaza Strip

Nov-05

1277

May-09

EUBAM (Ukraine- Moldova)

EUBAM (UkraineMoldova)

Dec-05

1247

May-09

EUPOL COPPS (Palestine)

EUPOL COPPS (Palestine)

Jan-06

1216

May-09

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

EUPAT (fYROM) (Macedonia)

EUPAT (fYROM)

Jan-06

181

Jul-06

EUPT (Kosovo)

EUPT (Kosovo)

Macedonia

Apr-06

822

Jul-08

EUFOR RD CONGO

EUFOR RD CONGO

Jul-06

153

Dec-06

EUPOL RD CONGO

EUPOL RD CONGO

Jul-07

670

May-09

EUPOL (Afghanistan)

EUPOL (Afghanistan)

Jul-07

670

May-09

EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (Chad/Central
African

EUFOR TCHAD/RCA

Feb-08

394

Mar-09

EUSSR (Guinea-Bissau)

EUSSR (Guinea-Bissau)

May-08

365

May-09

EULEX (Kosovo)

EULEX (Kosovo)

Jul-08

304

May-09

EUMM (Georgia)

EUMM (Georgia)

Oct-08

212

May-09

EUNAVCO, repl. by EU NAVFOR
(Somalia)

EUNAVCO, repl. by EU
NAVFOR (Somalia)

Sep-08

91

Dec-08

EUNAVFOR (Somalia)

EUNAVFOR (Somalia)

Dec-08

151

May-09

Chad/Central African
Republic
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Adapted from ISIS Europe, “Chart and Table of CSDP and EU missions,” European Security Review, No. 44, May 2009, available from
isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_276_isis-esdpchart-may09.pdf.

Table 3. CSDP Mission Deployments as of
May 2009.
The Treaty of Lisbon.
On December 1, 2009, the EU foreign and security
capability was significantly enhanced when the EU
Treaty of Lisbon (Portugal)24 came into force. Among
its many features is the creation of a new position:
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a post that centralizes the
responsibility for the EU diplomatic service, defense
and security, and the distribution of development aid.
The consolidation of these functions under one EU official gives the EU a powerful crisis management tool,
akin to combining the U.S. Departments of State and
18

Defense.25 If nonstate “winning hearts and minds”
conflicts are the future of crisis management, the EU
appears to be light-years ahead of NATO.
The Lisbon Treaty introduced two innovations
into the EU’s foreign and security policy that lay the
groundwork for even more control of Europe’s security by Europeans. These innovations are the mutual
defense clause and the solidarity pledge. The former
states that:
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression
on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the
means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the
specific character of the security and defence policy of
certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation
in this area shall be consistent with commitments under
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those
States which are members of it, remains the foundation
of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation. (Title V, Article 42)26

The solidarity pledge states that:
The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a
spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a

terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made
disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments
at its disposal, including the military resources made
available by the Member States. . . . ”27(Article 222,
Title VII)

While the two clauses may not significantly alter
the EU’s security landscape now, it is the author’s
opinion that they are an indication of how the Europeans view the management of their security as the
EU continues to coalesce into an ever more integrated
entity.
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The Question for U.S. Policymakers.
The last decade has dramatically altered the security arrangements that have existed in Europe since
1949. The question that now confronts American policymakers is: If NATO and American military assets
are no longer necessary for security missions being
launched by the EU around the world, what is the
purpose of NATO?
As impressive as the growth of CSDP has been, its
performance in the field is equally noteworthy. The
next section provides an overview of three CSDP missions chosen to demonstrate the increasing maturity
and complexity of the EU military-civilian crisis management capabilities and to illuminate the changed
geopolitical Euro-Atlantic security environment to
which NATO must adapt if it is to remain relevant.
EU’S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE
POLICY IN ACTION
During its first decade of existence, the EU deployed
27 missions28 using its CSDP instruments. CSDP has
evolved from the 1998 declaration of intent at St. Malo
to an organization that the EU can and has used to deploy military and civilian missions thousands of miles
from Brussels. An impressive achievement, especially
considering that the evolution has had to navigate the
shoals of EU decisionmaking that requires unanimity between a grouping of sovereign states to make
unanimous decisions in a sensitive area—foreign and
security policy.
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Four aspects of the EU’s missions are worth noting.
1. The geographic spread of these missions. CSDP
has been used to plan and deploy missions over an
area that stretches from Africa, through the Middle
East, into Asia.29
2. Sophistication of management and control.
CSDP has evolved sufficiently already to control multiple missions at one time. Table 3 shows all the missions that were active during May 2009.
3. Civilian-Military mission coordination. Even
before the Lisbon Treaty consolidated military, civilian, and development aid capabilities of the EU under one official—the Union’s High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy—the EU was able
to deploy and coordinate these resources in a number
of missions. NAVFOR, the EU’s first Naval mission,
for instance, uses EU Navy warships and helicopters,
lawyers, prosecutors, court administration specialists,
computer advisors, and diplomats in a concerted effort to intercept pirates in the horn of Africa, capture
them, and prosecute them.
4. Deploying where NATO cannot. EU missions
have been able to deploy into countries that did not
want a NATO presence in their country because
NATO is viewed as an extension of American foreign
and military policy. Two such missions—the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and the military mission
to Chad—are further analyzed in this monograph.
Three of these CSDP deployments are described to illuminate the diversity of assets and skills that the EU
has at its disposal for crisis management missions and
illustrates the experience it has now accumulated by
combining military as well as nonmilitary assets to
achieve mission objectives.30
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The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM).31
Duration: September 15, 2005-December 15, 2006.
Location: Aceh province, Indonesia.
Total Cost: E15 million ($22.5 million).32
Mission Strength: 125 EU personnel and 93 ASEAN
personnel.
Contributing States: 12 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Lithuania, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK)
and seven third countries (Norway, Switzerland, and
these Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN) states: Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore,
and the Philippines).
Highlights of the Mission’s Mandate. To monitor:
•	The demobilization of Free Aceh Movement
(GAM) and monitor and assist in the decommissioning and destruction of its weapons;
•	The redeployment of . . . Indonesian military
and police;
•	The reintegration of active GAM members into
society;
•	The human rights situation in the context of the
above tasks; and,
•	The process of legislation change in Aceh.
To rule on disputed amnesty cases, and to investigate and rule on violations of the mission’s Memorandum of Understanding (MOU.)
Summary Discussion of Mission. From October 1976
until August 2005, the Indonesian province of Aceh
was wracked by armed conflict between the Free Aceh
Movement (GAM), which sought Acehnese independence, and the Indonesian security forces, which
sought to prevent such separation.
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The AMM comprised monitors from the EU, Norway, and Switzerland, as well as five ASEAN countries: Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines,
and Singapore. This was the first such cooperation
between the EU and another regional organization,
and it was as successful as it was ground breaking. A
senior NATO military official told the author both the
Indonesian Government and members of the GAM
had refused to allow either NATO or United Nations
(UN) involvement in the Aceh mission. “They wanted
the EU to handle this mission because the two sides
in the conflict believed only the EU had credibility as
a soft power with military strength,” the official said.
AMM personnel comprised both civilians and
military located at the mission’s headquarters and in
11 district offices with mixed civil-military teams. The
decommissioning teams were predominantly military
and were also tasked primarily with monitoring the
security aspects of the MOU such as decommissioning, demobilization, and redeployment. The civilian
personnel of the AMM had diplomatic and managerial skills.
Results Achieved. The decommissioning of GAM
weapons, the demobilization of GAM, the redeployment of the Indonesian security forces, and the facilitation of transition from conflict to peace in Aceh—a
peace that still holds today. While the AMM demonstrated EU skills in coordinating military, civilian, legal, diplomatic, and development-aid instruments to
fashion a successful crisis management intervention,
its military component did not take center stage. The
2008-09 mission to the center of Africa, however, demonstrated the EU’s ability to successfully mobilize,
deploy, and sustain a mobile fighting force thousands
of miles away from Brussels. Its area of operations,
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250,000 square kilometers (96,525 square miles), was
half the size of France.
Both in terms of cost and size, the African mission
dwarfs the Aceh operation and underscores the EU’s
ability to scale its crisis management interventions to
fit different needs. The mission underscored the credibility of the EU’s military capability and was the largest and most demanding EU military mission to date.
As in the Aceh mission, the local governments had
made it clear that they would not permit either NATO
or the U.S. military forces to operate on their soil.33
The EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad
and in the Central African Republic
(EUFOR Tchad/RCA).34
Duration: March 15, 2008-December 15, 2009.
Location: Chad and the Central African Republic.
Total Cost: E1 billion ($1.5 billion).
Mission Strength: 10,000 troops mobilized to deploy
and maintain a force of 3,700 troops in theater over the
duration of mission.
Contributing States: 23 contributing Member States
(all but Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, and Malta) and
three third countries (Russia, Albania, and Croatia).
Highlights of the mission’s mandate:
•	To contribute to protecting civilians in danger,
particularly refugees and displaced persons;
•	To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid
and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the
area of operations; and,
•	To contribute to protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement
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of its own staff and the UN and associated personnel.
Summary Discussion of Mission:35 The EU military
deployment to Chad (EUFOR TChad/RCA)36 consisted of troops from 23 of the 27 EU states, and, significantly, three non-EU countries, Albania, Croatia, and
Russia, whose forces were integrated under EU command. Albania and Croatia provided force protection
platoons. Russia provided four heavy lift helicopters
and their crews.37
Under Irish and French command, the mission
ran under the CSDP framework from March 2008 to
April 2009. Authorized by a UN Security Council Resolution, the mission’s objective was to protect more
than 200,000 refugees from Darfur, and some 225,000
people displaced by internal fighting in Chad and the
Central African Republic.
Irish Lieutenant General Patrick Nash was the operation commander of the mission and ran his command
from the operational headquarters in Mont-Valerien,
near Paris, while French Brigadier-General Jean-Phillipe Ganascia was the “in theater” force commander,
in charge of the military forces on the ground. Elite
Irish rangers supported by special operations forces
from Austria, Belgium, France, and Sweden prepared
four operating zones after the mission was approved
by the EU and had received clearance by Chad and the
Central African Republic in January 2008. The entire
force was deployed and in operation by the summer.
The deployment was a significant military logistical operation considering that thousands of tons of
military equipment, fuel, and water had to first be
shipped to Douala, Cameroon, on the East African
coast—a 2-week journey from Europe. Then supplies
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had to be transported another 1,700 km to Chad, a
distance equivalent to traveling from Rome to Stockholm, using containers, trucks, and other vehicles on
rough roads. Camps had to be built from scratch in the
middle of the desert to house the 3,700 troops.
To get to the operations zone in the center of Africa, an air bridge was established from Europe to
N’Djamena, and a sea-land bridge was set up from
the port city of Douala in the Cameroon to Chad. Ultimately, over 2,400 units (containers and vehicles) of
equipment would be transported through Cameroon,
and 540 air transport flights would fly troops and
equipment directly from Europe to Chad.
Italian troops installed a field hospital with 15 airconditioned interlinked tents containing operating
rooms, x-ray equipment, a pharmacy, and a dentistry
unit. To ensure that the insurgents understood early
on that the Europeans meant business, multinational
special force units carried out reconnaissance missions
deep into hostile territory.
In order to minimize the loss of life, once the force
was fully established, extensive operations using air
and ground assets were undertaken to target specific
areas of concern and to display the force’s military
capabilities. Long range patrols were sent throughout
the area of operation to project EUFOR Tchad/RCA
as a credible force with a significant deterrent effect. A
coordinated information campaign underpinned the
military deployment. UN personnel, who would ultimately take over from the EUFOR, were co-located in
EUFOR’s camps, and the military provided a security
umbrella that enabled the deployment of the UN force
after mission completion.
General Nash asked for and got extremely robust
rules of engagement. He wanted the highest level of
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rules he could get to ensure the mission was successful in completing its mandate and for the security of
the soldiers. “I have no quibbles with the European
Council in this respect because they approved what I
wanted to do in Chad,” the general told the author of
this report.38
Nash’s military preparations proved prescient.
The EU force found itself militarily engaged in the
first month of the deployment. “There was a major
altercation near the Sudanese border, I mean a major
fire-fight,” Nash told the author. “We had to bring in
helicopters to support the troops and to extricate them.
Our troops found themselves engaged against regular
military units and lost one soldier in the engagement.
“But we dealt with it strongly and taught them a good
lesson,” Nash said.39
Within weeks after the first engagement, an Irish
contingent was attacked by a well organized rebel
force outside the town of Goz Beida, Chad. It was another serious fire-fight, and the rebel militia sustained
a number of casualties. This was followed by a number of subsequent occasions when Belgian and Austrian troops fought off attacks in the North of Chad
and killed a number of the enemy. Nash went out of
his way to speak about the French and Polish troops
attached to his force. They never hesitated to engage
the enemy to defend the mission’s mandate.
Results Achieved.40 EUFOR Tchad/RCA met its
objectives. On March 14, 2009, Transfer of Authority
(ToA) documents were executed in theater, simultaneously in Chad and the Central African Republic. The
ToA marked the handover of responsibility to a UN
follow-on force, the UN Mission in the Central African
Republic and Chad, MINURCAT.
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Upon the conclusion of the EU military mission,
a significant number of EUFOR troop-contributing
nations agreed to re-hat their troops to MINURCAT,
thereby embedding a high level of continuity and experience into the UN follow-on force.
EUMM Georgia: The European Union Monitoring
Mission in Georgia.41
The United States has traditionally played a central
role in resolving military crises in Europe. This American monopoly ended on October 1, 2008, when the EU
Monitoring Mission in Georgia became operational.
The conflict between Georgia and Russia marked a
milestone in Euro-Atlantic security relations. Not only
was the United States not a party to negotiating an end
to the conflict, it does not play a role in monitoring the
ceasefire. For the first time in recent history, a European conflict was ended by Europeans themselves. Of
the 27 EU states, 24 participated in this mission.
Duration: September 15, 2008—ongoing.
Location: Along the borders between undisputed
Georgian territory on the one hand and the breakaway
regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other.
Budget: E49.6 million ($74.40 million) 2008-10.
Mission Strength: 340.
Contributing states: 24 Member States (Austria,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the UK).
Highlights of the mission’s mandate:
•	Provide civilian monitoring of the conflict parties’ behavior, including full compliance with
the six-point agreement of August 12, 2008;
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•	Close cooperation with partners, namely the
UN and the OSCE;
•	Main objectives: long term stability throughout
Georgia after the war; and,
•	Tasks: stabilization, normalization, confidence
building, and reporting.
Summary Discussion of Mission. The outbreak of
hostilities between Georgia, South Ossetia, and Russia
on August 7, 2008, paralyzed the international actors
hitherto involved in conflict resolution in Georgia. In
this situation, the EU under the French Presidency
quickly moved in to close the gap.
On September 8, 2008, Russia and the EU concluded an additional agreement on the implementation of
the six-point [ceasefire] plan.
The mission mandate by definition covers the
whole of Georgia, hence including South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. Within 2 weeks of the adoption of the Joint
Agreement, the Union was able to establish the mission headquarters in Tbilisi and four regional offices
and to deploy more than 200 monitors as well as technical and support staff.
The EUMM’s monitoring activity is not limited
to security developments in the narrow sense of the
word. The mission mandate encompasses “soft areas”
such as monitoring and reporting on the normalization of civil governance with a focus on the rule of
law, human rights, and the humanitarian situation of
the local population.
Results Achieved. The record speed of its implementation proved the EU capability to react quickly
in a situation of serious crisis, provided that sufficient
political will and strong leadership exists. Through
the creation of the EUMM, the EU has considerably
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increased its profile in conflict resolution. The mission
has quickly delivered on its first and most prominent
task, the stabilization of the situation after the war.
The EUMM therefore represents a success for the
CSDP.
The author made it a point to ask every European
interlocutor for this analysis if they thought the EU
was now able to defend Europe. Without exception,
the answer was in the affirmative. With one caveat: if
we have the will. American military power embedded
in NATO has brought Europe from its weakened state
after World War II to today, when it is hard to imagine
a threat to the European homeland that cannot be met
by the EU and its CSDP.
The question that must now be asked by U.S. policymakers is: given a robust, proven, and growing EU
military-civilian capability in a benign European environment with no serious threat, what should be the
future purpose of NATO?
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
NATO used to be a tightly focused and effective
military alliance, its members unified under the pressures of an existential threat from a nuclear armed
and aggressive Soviet Union. With the collapse of the
Soviet Union, NATO’s original reason for existence
disappeared. The Soviet Union disintegrated years
ago and the unity of purpose disappeared with it.
NATO’s dreams of being a world cop are withering in
the mountains of Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, over the last decade the EU security
and defense establishment—Common Security and
Defense Policy (CSDP)—has organized and deployed
27 successful military/civil missions from Africa to
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Asia, including the EU’s first ever naval force now operating in the Horn of Africa. Through CSDP, Europeans are increasingly taking charge of managing their
own foreign and security policy. NATO is no longer
the sole and preeminent Euro-Atlantic security actor.
As the EU continues its slow but steady march
to—if not a United States of Europe, certainly a United
Europe of ever closer States—its need to have security assets that reflect the EU’s national interests will
continue to grow. Increasingly, the EU will want and
need to make security decisions without involving the
United States in the process.
With the rise of the EU’s CSDP and the downward trajectory of NATO, the security compact that
has existed since 1949 between Europe and the United
States—that America and NATO are central to the
security of Europe—is increasingly obsolete. Meanwhile, cuts to the U.S. defense budget and the stress of
two decade-long wars on America’s military resources also underscore the need to recalibrate the EuroAtlantic security relationship.
Policy Options.
Broadly speaking, the United States faces two policy options in responding to the Euro-Atlantic security
developments laid out in this report:
1. Business as usual. Continue to believe that
NATO, and the United States as NATO’s leader, are
indispensible for European security.
2. Bridge NATO with CSDP and re-mission NATO
as a platform for Canada, the United States, and the
EU to use only when the three decide a security threat
exceeds the capacity of the EU’s defense capabilities.
This alternative assumes the EU will be responsible
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for the day-to-day security needs of Europe, and action via NATO will be an unusual circumstance.
Ramifications of Options.
Using option 1 is the easy decision. No politically
difficult choices need be made in choosing it. But it
is the wrong choice. For reasons outlined herein,
this choice will lead to an increasingly dysfunctional
NATO and more friction between the Alliance members: between America and Europe but also between
the European states. The choice of this option will result in further weakening NATO and the transatlantic
relationship. In time, NATO may well be reduced to
something akin to a discussion group, or, as the author believes, more likely it will simply fade away.
Option 2 is the option recommended to U.S. military and congressional decisionmakers. This option
rests on the author’s belief, based on his research and
discussions with officials on both sides of the Atlantic, that Europe is increasingly capable of defending
its periphery with the EU’s CSDP. It no longer needs
NATO or American troops for this purpose.
Although it removes NATO and U.S. forces from
day-to-day European security concerns, this option
leaves NATO and its operational bureaucracy in place,
but bridged to CSDP. Under this option NATO’s assets are freely available to support CSDP operations,
and the assets are in place for Canada, the EU, and the
United States to use in an extreme security event that
threatens the entire Atlantic constituency.
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Execution of Policy Recommendation #2.
The United States should take the initiative to
implement the recommendation by inviting the Canadian Prime-Minister and the President of the European Council (or another EU official, or a group of EU
officials nominated by the EC) to a top level meeting
with two items on the agenda:
1. Endorse the recalibration of the Euro-Atlantic
security relationship as described in option #2; and,
2. Authorize the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense, the Canadian Foreign and Defense Ministers,
and the EU High Representative of Foreign and Security Policy to put together an action plan to bridge
CSDP and NATO.
The two biggest obstacles to combining CSDP and
NATO are the political confrontation between Cyprus
(supported by Greece) and Turkey, and the fact that
the United States is not a member of the EU, which
means America cannot be part of CSDP or the EU decisionmaking process.
The Cyprus-Turkey bottleneck can be summarized
as follows. Cyprus is a member of the EU but not of
NATO. Turkey is a member of NATO but not of the
EU, which it aspires to join. A number of European
states now oppose Turkey’s accession to the EU, even
though the EU invited Turkey to join as far back as
1987. As matters now stand, EU-NATO collaboration
is vetoed by Turkey because Cyprus is not a NATO
member, and Cyprus in turn responds by vetoing
Turkey’s EU aspirations.42 This state of affairs has persisted for some 7 years and shows no sign of being resolved through intra-European negotiations. The author believes the only way to overcome the bottleneck
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is through direct involvement of the Canadian Prime
Minister, the U.S. President, and the EU leadership.
The issue of the United States not being a member
of the EU is an obstacle only if the United States insists on being involved in EU decisions that deal with
European security and defense. Once the EU assumes
responsibility for the defense of Europe’s periphery, it
is not necessary for the United States to be a party to
internal EU decisionmaking.
As a part of the discussion to bridge CSDP and
NATO, the transatlantic allies should negotiate procedures and structures to allow CSDP to use NATO’s
bureaucracy without the need to request permission
from the United States. For example, while the EU
does have a strategic planning capability embedded in
its Military Staff, it does not have a permanent operational headquarters (OHQ) to convert a strategic plan
with a broad political-military mission into actionable
military objectives and to then exercise the command
and control functions necessary to execute the mission. Due to political resistance (mainly, but not solely, from the United States and Britain), CSDP missions
are deployed using an ad-hoc system of OHQs that
are set up for each mission and dismantled after it.
Giving the EU responsibility for European defense
would also require that the EU be able to set up a permanent OHQ to interface with its existing strategic
planning capability. It may well be that the EU chooses to use NATO’s long established OHQ at SHAPE
as a kernel for its OHQ. The EU should be able to do
this and use the OHQ without any need to involve the
United States and Canada or seek their permission.
Perhaps, as a part of the negotiations to bridge
CSDP and NATO a latent North American pillar
could be established within the OHQ. Should Canada,
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the EU, and the United States decide to act militarily
together, this pillar would be operationalized.43
Impact of Policy Recommendation.
On NATO. The biggest impact of implementing
this report’s recommendation will be to halt further
deterioration of NATO’s relevance to Euro-Atlantic
security. The recommendation will help recalibrate
the transatlantic security compact, and preserve an
Alliance that has developed and perfected institutions
to facilitate military operations between Canada, the
EU, and the United States.
Were NATO to fade away, these institutions would
have to be recreated before the three parties could act
together to defend their interests in the event of an extraordinary threat that requires American superpower
assets. It is doubtful if NATO or a like structure could
again be created in time to meet such a threat.
There are political advantages to recalibrating
NATO as described above in order to preserve it. Although Europeans are firmly opposed to NATO’s war
in Afghanistan and refused to participate in the Iraqi
war, polling clearly shows the NATO brand is widely
admired by citizens on both sides of the Atlantic.44
Therefore, preserving NATO is in the best interest of
the wider transatlantic relationship.
On the United States. As demonstrated in the following analysis by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), there is a tangible cost associated with the
American commitment to defend Europe.
•	The Department of Defense (DoD) Overseas
Cost Report prepared by the CRS, shows that
the cost for maintaining America’s military
presence in Europe in FY 2010 was around $12
billion.45
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•	In an earlier CRS report prepared during
1983-92, a period that included the Cold War,
Congress required the DoD to account for the
costs of U.S. forces available for the defense of
Europe against the Soviet Union and its allies.
Some of this information was made public and
showed around 50 to 60 percent of America’s
defense budget (then, typically around $150
billion) was allocated to the defense of Europe.
That would mean $75 billion-$90 billion was allocated during 1983-92 for defending Europe.46
The CRS qualified this analysis by adding the
following caveat to its cost projections for the
post Cold-War years.
— In the post-Cold War era, the DoD has shifted away from a strategy focused on a U.S.Soviet conflict in Europe to one focused on
two major regional contingencies (MRCs).
Given that all U.S. military forces are dedicated to fighting and winning first one and
then, if necessary, two MRCs, any measure
of the total costs of regional commitments
simply would reflect DOD’s top line—a requested $257.8 billion in budget authority
in FY1996. Thus, setting aside the issue of
flaws in the methodology, in the post-Cold
War era a calculation of total costs of regional commitments would provide no additional useful input to the burden sharing
debate.47
Without recourse to information on present American contingency plans to defend Europe (which are of
necessity classified), it is not possible to further quantify the financial impact of implementing the report’s
recommendation. But it is safe to assert, based on the
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two reports cited above, that there will be a reduction
in defense expenditures allocated to the defense of Europe if this monograph’s recommendation is adopted.
Adoption of this recommendation will also have an
important indirect impact on the U.S. military that has
been under stress for over a decade through continuous involvement in two wars. Europe’s assumption
of responsibility for its own defense can help reduce
this stress level because it will result in a lowering of
America’s defense commitments.
The European Union. For the EU, the biggest impact
of assuming responsibility for the defense of Europe
will be in accelerating the efforts already under way
to rationalize EU defense spending, which currently
stands at around $300 billion. These expenditures by
the EU states and the EU’s defense assets are shown
in Table 2.
The financial crisis that has hobbled defense spending on both sides of the Atlantic is finally forcing the
EU states to pool their defense capabilities. While the
EU is comprised of 28 states, four of them—Britain,
France, Germany, and Italy—account for over 70 percent of the EU’s defense spending. Britain and France
alone comprise 43 percent and are projected to spend
65 percent of the EU’s defense spending 2013.48 During the last year, all four countries have begun to pool
their defense assets and reduce their national defense
expenditures.
Leading this charge are France and Britain, with
their December 2010 decision to share their aircraft carrier, nuclear weapon, and cyber-warfare operations.49
In February 2010, Germany renewed calls for an allEuropean Army to continue pooling EU resources.50
The recommendation made here will act as a catalyst
for accelerating this trend.
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The Transatlantic Alliance. If there is one constant
in transatlantic security relations, it is America’s criticism of Europe’s defense expenditures. The criticism
does nothing but create more friction between the
transatlantic allies. It is a perpetual thorn in American-European relations.
“If the Europeans did not increase their defense
spending during the Cold War, they will certainly not
do it today,” General Hǻkan Syrén, Chairman of the
EU Military Committee flatly put it to the author during the conversations for this monograph. The General sees no possibility of an increase in EU defense
expenditures for the foreseeable future.
The recommendation made herein will change this
narrative. Europe will spend what it feels is necessary
for its own defense. The recommendation will also ease
the continuing friction over the differing geopolitical
threat perspectives of the EU and the United States,
and make the transatlantic relationship smoother.51 In
view of the continuing importance of the transatlantic
relationship, this might be the biggest benefit of all resulting from the recommendation to bridge CSDP and
NATO.52
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For me, the special feature of this transatlantic partnership is our sharing of the same fundamental values,
meaning we do not have to endlessly debate our interpretation of human rights and respect for the dignity of
the person. Our common ground is the sharing of these
fundamental values—something that goes for every
partnership between German Federal Chancellors and
American Presidents, and likewise for partnerships all
the way down to the level of members of parliament and
local politicians in the states of the Union and the German Länder. The dignity of every individual human being is our Benchmark.
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